很值得讀這篇文章！著名經濟學家Stephen Roach最近寫了這篇重磅文章，扼要地解釋了香港為何沒落，成為中國城市，其中法治被嚴重侵蝕是重要的原因。他強調，當中的主因是23條的內容，扼殺言論及新聞自由（條例經過立法會倉猝通過，中央是否知悉當中的條文，尤其有關煽動罪，會影響言論及新聞自由？這值得進一步的探討）。
Roach指出舊的香港已死！表面看，作者是消極的，但他只是冒着被批評的危險講真話，為的就是香港能夠改變，重現生機。我們能否返回以往的香港？是否舊香港，一個充滿獨特性、優越性的城市，真的已經玩完？有沒有轉機？文章沒有回答這些問題，我們認為這視乎中央會否轉變管治香港的方法，會否為香港鬆綁，也有機制不讓下面的人自把自為，讓自由再現。
我們誠意推介這篇文章給中央官員，及香港社會，讓大家一起反思，調整，讓香港重生，互勉！
請讀全文：
Yes, the Hong Kong of Old is Over
By STEPHEN ROACH
JUL 25, 2026
The pro-China camp continues to tout Hong Kong’s resilience, recently pointing to the fact that the city has reclaimed its position as the global IPO leader. But conveniently left out of this narrative is that resileince has come to depend on the direct intervention of Mainland Chinese authorities.
Hong Kong deserves credit for putting up a fight. In the nearly two and a half years since I expressed the apparently controversial opinion that Hong Kong is “over,” the city’s boosters have orchestrated a determined campaign to prove otherwise.
At first glance, this heroic defense seems to have some merit. Hong Kong’s economy has been relatively resilient, and a resurgence of the Hang Seng index has erased memories of the 2018–20 collapse stemming from political turmoil. Moreover, the city has reclaimed its position as the global IPO leader, giving it bragging rights as Asia’s premier financial center. Paul Chan, Hong Kong’s financial secretary, and other leading government officials consistently sing its praises.
Beneath the surface, however, the story is very different. Beijing’s hostile takeover following the pro-democracy demonstrations of 2019–20 has transformed Hong Kong into just another big Chinese city. Today, its Mandarin name, Xiānggǎng (香港, “fragrant harbor”), which celebrates the city’s pre-colonial Chinese heritage, seems more apt than Hong Kong, a phonetic translation from Cantonese, the city’s long dominant dialect.
This dramatic transformation into Xiānggǎng is the real story. Hong Kong’s defenders are in denial about this new chameleon-like identity, instead viewing it as another example the city’s inherent resilience. Nice try.
IPO leadership, long the most precious jewel in the city’s financial-services crown, is a glaring case in point. The city’s return to the top spot in 2025 was driven by listings of mainland Chinese companies such as CATL, Luxshare Precision, Z.ai, Momenta, and Montage Technology. By one estimate, they account for as much as 90–95% of recent funds raised. Hong Kong is less a thriving global IPO market than a major platform for Chinese issuers.
The rule of law, long regarded as one of Hong Kong’s greatest institutional advantages, has been severely compromised. In 2020, China bypassed the Hong Kong legislature and imposed a sweeping national security law. Four years later, Hong Kong’s lawmakers rushed through Article 23, an expansion of the 2020 security law that integrated China’s national security framework into the city’s legal system. These changes have stifled open debate, resulted in new arrests and harsh sentences for previously imprisoned activists, led to closures of independent bookstores, and destroyed any semblance of a free press.
Moreover, six foreign judges have resigned from Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal, calling the independence of the city’s highest judicial authority into serious question. Among the departures was Jonathan Sumption, one of England’s most brilliant jurists, who warned in the Financial Times that a Mainland strain of “judicial ‘patriotism’” was poisoning the city’s legal system.
Lastly, there are the people. While Hong Kongers remain understandably proud of their heritage, and the city’s overall population has held steady at around 7.5 million since 2020, there has been a dramatic shift in the composition of the workforce. The Hong Kong government does not publish official emigration statistics by nationality, but research points to a significant outflow of expats, including many mid- and senior-level professionals, since 2020, followed by a surge of Chinese workers from the mainland. Walking the streets of Hong Kong today, one is just as likely to hear Mandarin as Cantonese.
Taken together, this represents a fundamental transformation in Hong Kong’s character. The city’s stunning outward appearance remains. But that hardly justifies the tales of competitive innovation that the pro-China camp spins. Conveniently left out of this narrative is that this resilience has been largely made in China, not in Hong Kong. China’s stock-market stimulus of September 2024, for example, propelled equity markets upward, unleashing a torrent of Chinese IPOs that were consciously steered to Hong Kong’s sophisticated equity-distribution platform. And now the PRC’s “national team” is attempting to do it again.
It is obvious that Hong Kong’s economic performance is closely correlated with China’s. Thus, sluggish Chinese GDP growth, which slid below target to 4.3% in the second quarter of 2026, will undoubtedly weigh down Hong Kong’s growth.
The Hong Kong government seems to think that Chinese-style central planning offers new hope for its economy and recently launched its first five-year plan. But, as China is painfully learning, such plans can often over-promise and under-deliver. This suggests that until there is a meaningful test of the downside—for the economy or the equity market—any conclusions drawn about Hong Kong’s newfound resilience are at best premature.
To some extent, I have become a lightning rod in the “Hong Kong is over” debate. Hong Kong and Chinese officials are quick to pounce on my comments. Local journalists often ask if I am ready to admit that I was wrong (particularly after I conceded that a managed stock market has risen more than I had expected). Just the other day, a leading reporter messaged me: “‘Hong Kong is over’ seems over. What would you say about it?” Well, let me be clear: the Hong Kong of old is, indeed, over. Go to Xiānggǎng and see for yourself.
以上文章轉載自 Stephen Roach 於Substack.com的專屬平台